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Abstract 
China has experienced significant social, economic, and political transformations 
since its economic reform started in the late 1970s. Considerable changes in its 
policy-making and implementation approaches have also emerged. Confronted with 
the intensified tension between the call for efficiency and strong pressure to improve 
social welfare, the Chinese government had no choice but to become instrumentally 
pragmatic in adopting different governance strategies to address the increasingly 
complex social, economic, and political developments. Thus, neoliberal tenets were 
introduced. This article sets out to examine, against the wider policy context, how 
neoliberal tenets, particularly its emphasis on market principles, have been injected in 
higher education governance. This article aims to explore how the multi-faceted 
dynamics shaped the development of transnational higher education and influenced 
the governance of Sino-foreign cooperation universities.  
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Introduction: Increased Multifaceted Characteristic of Educational Governance 
The growing influence of neoliberalism has not only shaped how Asian states manage 
their economic affairs but also how they formulate public policy and manage the 
public sector (Carroll 2012; Stubbs 2009; Hayashi 2010). This politically imposed 
discourse (derived mostly from Western hegemony) (Olssen and Peters 2005) has 
been adopted by many Asian states (including China) in managing social service 
delivery to unleash the power of the market in enhancing capital formation, promoting 
resource allocation, and sustaining economic growth or welfare gains to overcome the 
challenges of globalization (World Bank 2002; Carroll and Jarvis 2013; Jomo 2001).  
 Higher education (HE) is not immune to this global and regional trend (Mok, 
1997; Whitty and Power 2000). However, neoliberalism cannot be translated simply to 
the withdrawal of a nation state in providing social welfare. Rather, neoliberalism is “a 
new mode of regulation or form of governmentality” that believes in the state’s capacity 
of “creating the appropriate market by providing the conditions, laws, and institutions 
necessary for its operation” (Olssen and Peters 2005, p. 314–315), which distinguishes 
itself from classic neoliberalism despite sharing the same central gist (the favor of free 
market economy and trade). This view is echoed with the most influential discussion on 
neoliberalism proposed by Harvey (2007) with clear emphasis on the education market, 
which “must be created” by the state (p. 2). Margnison (2013) further illustrated this 
point by stating that “government cannot abstain on public goods, though it quibbles 
over funding them” (p. 366). Hence, the function of the ruling regime’s in creating a 
“quasi-market” of education (Levačić 1995, p. 167) is undeniable. 
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  Two questions also emerge when exploring the influence of neoliberal ideology on 
transnational higher education (TNHE) in the current study: first, with reference to 
Bernstein’s recontextualising rule (1990), when a certain kind of knowledge moves 
from one context to another, a space that permits “interruption, disruption and 
change” is created (Singh, Thomas and Harris 2013, p. 469). The adoption of 
neoliberalism in different Asian countries should also be differentiated. In particular, 
attention should be focused on the authoritarian features of the political structure and 
governance when analyzing the Chinese case (He and Warren 2011). Second, Hayek 
pointed out that state planning and market tenets in China are incompatible because 
local knowledge engendered from “particular circumstances of time and place” is 
essential in achieving efficiency, which the central government lacks (Hayek, 1944, p. 
521). Systematic research is required to understand how market principles have been 
realized in a traditionally authoritarian country and influenced public sector 
management.  
A plausible explanation is the trend of decentralization, which is ubiquitous in 
many East Asian nations (Rondinelli 1983) as a character of neoliberalism (Dale 
1997). Hanson (1998) stated that decentralization is “the transfer of decision-making 
authority, responsibility, and tasks from higher to lower organizational levels or 
between organizations” (p. 112). However, problems remain unsolved and 
decentralizing approaches in Asian countries nations are diversified (Rondinelli 1983). 
Thus, particular attention should be given to the policy context when analyzing public 
management and policy-related matters (Bernstein, 1990). Howell (2006) suggested 
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that “the profusion of competing terms to describe the Chinese state in the reform 
period, such as ‘developmental’, ‘entrepreneurial’, ‘corporatist’, ‘market-facilitating’, 
‘regulatory’, ‘rent-seeking’, reflect not merely alternative explanations of state 
behaviors arising out of different normative and intellectual starting points, but, more 
significantly highlight deeper problems of fragmentation” (p. 282); hence, the single 
tendency of decentralization cannot explain the situation of “fragmentation.” 
In this paper, we adopt the dual decentralization model to synthesize the state 
power and market principle when analyzing their coordinated influence on the 
development of TNHE and in the governance of Sino-foreign cooperation universities. 
TNHE can be defined as “all types of higher education study where the learners are 
located in a country different from the one where awarding institution is based” 
(UNESCO/ Council of Europe 2001). Since its first appearance in the 1980s in China, 
TNHE has significantly increased from 2 in 1995 (Huang 2010) to 1,176 in 2016 
(Ministry of Education (MOE) 2016). However, studies on its development in 
consideration of China’s broad political and economic context and the participants’ 
perceptions on national regulation have been scarce. The possibility of conducting 
comprehensive studies on institutional governance, which include all transnational 
cooperation activities, have been few and far between because of China’s vast 
territory and the lack of regulations in TNHE’s initial development phase. Because of 
its relatively small number (eight established ones), we chose Sino-foreign 
cooperation universities, which are universities co-founded by foreign partners and 
Chinese universities, to explore the proposed research questions. We present our 
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theoretical framework, methodology directing data collection/ analysis, and major 
findings in the following section. We provide the discussion and conclusion in the 
final parts. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Dual Decentralization Model 
The Chinese state assumed responsibility for overseeing economic and social 
development during the transitional economy period, and has always vacillated 
between centralization and decentralization in governing the country because of its 
large geographical size. Therefore, observing centralized decentralization and 
decentralized centralization occurring simultaneously when designing and 
implementing policies to secure the state’s legitimacy and assert control over any 
economic and social activity deemed to have “strategic importance” is not surprising 
(Hsueh 2011; Mok and Wu 2013; Lardy 2014; Mok forthcoming). We have witnessed 
how economic and social reforms have dispersed the power within the state, which is 
described as “vertical decentralization.” The market force was launched to pursue the 
management of economic affairs and the governance of the social sectors (Wong and 
Flynn 2001; Mok et al. 2010), as demonstrated by the conversion from the central 
planning system to market mechanisms (Shen 2004) that represented the “horizontal 
decentralization” during this period. Vertical decentralization represents the clout 
(even decreasing) of the state, whereas horizontal decentralization represents the 
market force. Rocca (2003) proposed the term “societalization” to describe how a 
traditionally unified, centralized socialist country, such as China, has been “pushed 
6 
 
into the market” and become involved in handling the consequences of marketization 
(pp. 14–15). Thus, Painter and Mok’s dual decentralization model (2008) has realized 
the coordination of two seemly conflicting ideologies and thus, we utilize this model 
as our theoretical framework to explore the influence of the multi-actor aspects on 
development of TNHE and the governance of Sino-foreign cooperation universities 
(Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Dual decentralization in the transition economy 
Source: Painter and Mok (2008), p. 139. 
This framework describes the situation of the transitional economy and suits itself 
well in various nations (see Painter 2012 for Vietnam) and (sub-) fields (see Mok and 
Wu, 2013 for welfare regime; Huang 2015 for educational equity; and Wang and 
Chan 2015 for minban education). Adopting the model is relevant in understanding 
the Chinese experience, especially when the power dispersed within the state creates 
an environment for TNHE to develop while horizontal decentralization leads to the 
active participation of private entities in producing HE or TNHE opportunities. The 
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detailed explanation and discussion of each quadrant can be found in the findings 
section. The four cells have certain overlaps and the theoretical framework shows that 
the following analysis describes how dual decentralization has shaped the 
development of TNHE from 1995 to 2016. 
 
Methodology 
We employed document analysis and in-depth interviews in the data collection and 
adopted the following documents: 
• Policy statements, statistical reports, consultation papers, legislations, 
yearbooks, and websites produced by the MOE; 
• Mass media articles, college journals, or any other local articles regarding the 
topic of this thesis; 
• Official schedules and syllabus of courses in transnational cooperation 
programs and institutions; and 
• The official websites of foreign education providers and the Chinese 
partners. 
Twenty-nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with administrative/ 
academic staff, government officials, and student representatives in Mandarin 
(Chinese Language) or English (for details, see Appendix) in three of eight 
Sino-foreign cooperation universities in 2014–2016. University A was selected 
because of its prestigious overseas partner and the strong connection between the 
Chinese partner and this newly established HE institution (HEI). Universities B and C 
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demonstrate other aspects of TNHE, which are evidenced by their minor connection 
their Chinese partners and the criteria for faculty recruitment and quality assurance 
agencies. This selection of research sites cannot demonstrate all the aspects of 
Sino-foreign cooperation universities, and institutions vary in terms of academic 
prestige (referring to universities’ world rankings), support from the local government, 
connections with Chinese partners, and autonomy granted. 
Key informant and purposive sampling were employed to recruit respondents, 
and an analytic analysis was adopted. Some of the respondents were re-interviewed to 
clarify or update information during the writing process. Analytic induction was 
adopted for data analysis because we began our exploration with a hypothesis that 
policy recontextualization may happen when central regulations are interpreted and 
enacted by the local authorities. The realization of market force in authoritarian 
countries can be attributed to the decentralization trend. The analytic induction allows 
the revision of the research problem if the hypothesis is not supported by the data 
collected (Bryman 2004). 
 
Dual Decentralization in Governance and its Influence on TNHE Development in 
China 
Local Autarky 
According to the Painter and Mok (2008), “local autarky” in the first quadrant 
“describes the situation where economic policy is decentralized such that regional or 
local economies are increasingly free to operate autonomously in competition with 
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each other” (p. 139). We replace “economies” with HEIs and demonstrate our 
exploration from the educational aspect. This term describes the retreat of the Chinese 
government from the sole educational provider, which enabled the involvement of 
diversified participants in the provision of HE services and to compete with each 
other. 
The central government under the rule of Mao Zedong (1949–1978) treated 
education as a political tool to indoctrinate its citizens and ensure their political 
loyalty to the ruling regime. The Chinese government strictly regulated HEs and 
implemented a centralized educational system. HEIs had no autonomy over the 
administration, syllabi, curricula, textbooks, enrollment, allocation of schools or 
university seats, and personnel recruitment (Hao 1998; Ngok 2007). The communist 
government formulated educational policies, distributed educational resources, 
exerted administrative control, recruited teaching staff, and chose the curricula and 
textbooks (Ngok 2007; Yang et al. 2007). As stated by the MOE in the 1960s: 
“The establishment, change, and cancellation of programs in all these universities 
must be approved by the MOE … University teaching should be according to the 
syllabi designed or approved by the Ministry … No programs, syllabi, and 
textbooks should be changed easily. Any substantial changes must be approved 
by the Ministry.”  (Hu 2003, p. 4) 
Chinese universities had less autonomy in its institutional governance because the 
enrollment of students and employment of graduates were strictly controlled by the 
central authority. The rigid and inefficient system naturally led to insufficient supply 
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of educated labor force and hindered China’s economic development. Thus, the 
central government changed its “highly-centralized economic planning system” (Mok, 
2000, p. 122), which is considered as inefficient and incapable, to a market economy 
(Mok 2012). With the commencement of educational decentralization, a series of 
policies were issued to release the rigid central control over HE and to protect “the 
initiatives and enthusiasm of educational institutions” (Mok and Chan 2012, p. 114). 
The Program for China’s Educational Reform and Development issued by the State 
Council in 1993 “actively encourage and fully support social institutions and citizens 
to establish schools according to law and to provide correct guidelines and strengthen 
administration.” Therefore, “democratic parties, people bodies, social organizations, 
retired cadres and intellectuals, collective economic organizations, and individuals 
subject to the Party’s and governmental policies” were encouraged to “actively and 
voluntarily” contribute to “develop education by various forms and methods” (Mok 
2003, p. 258; see also Wei and Zhang 1995). The diversification of educational 
providers allowed the introduction of TNHE and illustrated the feature of 
privatization in Chinese HE in general and TNHE in particular. 
Privatization or Socialization 
“Privatization or socialization” in the third quadrant represents “the divestiture of 
assets or the handing over of production and distribution activities to the for-profit 
and the not-for-profit private sectors” (Painter and Mok 2008, p. 139). The situation in 
TNHE can be analyzed from two dimensions. First, we explore how “privatization or 
socialization” occurs in terms of fees charged by TNHE. The quadrant demonstrates 
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the nature of the “private good” of TNHE. Recognizing the changing nature of HE 
from public good to private commodity, as well as the heavy financial burden in 
subsidizing tertiary education, the central government began to charge students and 
their potential employers tuition fees in 19831. The HEIs were encouraged to look for 
alternative sources of funding rather than relying solely on either the central or local 
governments. Thus, the percentage of contract-study-scholarship and self-financed 
students began to increase in the mid-1980s. Moreover, the diversification of HE 
providers offered many choices to parents and their children (consumers) “in terms of 
curriculum, language of instruction, education provision, and school ethos” (Mok 
2000, p. 111), which illustrates the core notion of marketization (Mok 2000). Tuition 
fees for TNHE comprise the major (or even sole) source of income; one interviewee 
states, “We have to run our university on the basis of tuition fees from the students” 
(III2 2014). 
The policy promulgated by the central government echoes this statement. The 
cooperators of TNHE are required to calculate the cost per student and other 
accompanying costs before deciding on the tuition fees to be charged and applying for 
approval from the Price Bureau (Article 38, State Council 2003). The nature of TNHE 
could be considered a complete private commodity instead of a public good when the 
students who choose TNHE assume all of the costs of their HE. 
Second, the situation of “privatization or socialization” illustrates the 
involvement of private individuals or organizations in transnational cooperation 
activities. According to the MOE, 10 Sino-foreign cooperation second-tier colleges 
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(out of 63) claim that their partners require “reasonable” payback. The other eight 
colleges (out of 63) have no clarification on the issue of financial returns3 (MOE 
2016). The respondent from X provincial government confirmed this point by stating 
the following. 
“There is no clear policy/law to forbid private investment in TNHE since 
transnational cooperation is now regulated under the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Promotion1 of Privately-run Schools (Committee of the 
Ninth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China 2002). The 
only important thing is the private participants should be Chinese. If the financial 
input comes from foreign countries, the overseas investors have to deal with this 
strategically, like through the foreign partners of TNHE and then generate profits 
from such activity. If you refer the official website of the MOE, there are some 
activities clearly claim that they require reasonable payback [as we have 
discussed before]. Nevertheless, MOE requires them to save 25% of the profits 
(Article 29 MOE 2004) as the sustainable foundation to maintain the daily 
operation”.  (V 2015) 
An administrative staff from a newly established Sino-foreign cooperation 
university further illustrates this argument. 
“Even the local government has invested generously in supporting the foundation 
                                               
1 Students financially supported by their potential or current employers emerged in 1983, especially in coastal 
areas with a fast, regional economic growth. The students are trained in their designated HEIs with the requirement 
to pass the national college entrance examination. They must work for their contracted units after graduation. The 
number of contract-study-scholarship students increased from 3,200 in 1983 to 154,500 (7.5%) in 1991 (Law 1995, 
p. 331). 
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of our university; the initial funding is far from enough to maintain such a huge 
campus. We have to figure out other sources. It is lucky that the city (where the 
university is located) is the hometown of many successful entrepreneurs. We are 
now trying to contact them and generate some investments from this way. 
However, we can offer no concrete data/ information now since the idea is still in 
the preparation stage”. (IV 2015) 
The Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, which is one of the eight 
established Sino-foreign cooperation universities approved by the MOE, was 
supported by the Li Ka-shing Foundation (private). The University of Nottingham 
Ningbo is a product of the cooperation between the University of Nottingham of the 
UK and the Wanli Group in Ningbo, with major funding coming from the Chinese 
partner. Having donated all of its capital to the nation, the Wanli Group claimed to 
have balanced its incomes and expenditures independently without national 
investment. Some researchers have categorized this cooperation as an example of the 
third pattern in the Chinese HE system: “state-owned and people-run” (guoyou 
minban) HEI (Chen 2004, 2009; Wu 2001; Xu 2002). The vague nature of the Wanli 
Group blurs the “clear distinction between state and market or public and private” 
(Painter and Mok 2008, p. 139). Although the nature of the co-founder of the 
University of Nottingham Ningbo is uncertain, nevertheless, our interviewees 
considered Wanli Group as a private organization. Wanli’s example demonstrates the 
situation of “privatization or socialization” in TNHE and directs our awareness 
toward the last quadrant, “cellularization,” in the context of China. 
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Deconcentration and Cellularization 
We combine the second and fourth quadrants to explore the effects of decentralization 
and market force on the governance of TNHE, especially for Sino-foreign cooperation 
universities because both cells are concerned with administrative power devolution. 
“Deconcentration” includes “a range of types of administrative decentralization, 
including administrative delegation or vertical specialization of administrative 
functions, as well as various forms of political devolution and fiscal decentralization 
that accompany the delegation of local power and authority” (Painter and Mok 2008, 
p. 139). The relationship between central government and HEIs has changed 
significantly since the education reform in the 1980s. Mok (2002) pointed out that, 
“instead of exercising a ‘micro control’, that is, imposing a very tight control on all 
details of the operation of the higher education system, the central government now 
maintains a ‘macro control’ over higher education by giving policy directions and 
issuing policy principles” (p. 262). “Cellularization” on the fourth quadrant further 
illustrates this decentralizing process. The situation is described such that “[the] local 
economic and political units were able to block the upward flow of information and to 
cushion themselves from the effects of vertical commands” (Painter and Mok 2008, 
pp. 139–140). Under the decentralizing trend, “cellular power” appears at the local 
government level (Mok and Han 2016b) and at the institutional level, which we will 
explore in the following section. 
The central government released the Decision of the Central Committee of the 
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Chinese Communist Party of China on the Reform of the Educational System in 1985 
to change its “tight control over institutions to improve institutional autonomy under 
the national principles and plans” (Guo 1995, p. 69). TNHE, especially Sino-foreign 
cooperative universities, benefited significantly from the national policy. Professor 
Lehman, the Vice Chancellor of New York University Shanghai, stated that “we came 
to launch a campus in Shanghai under the condition of having the autonomy to 
promote the educational goals and practices of NYU” and pointed out that the 
“campus ‘will close’ if academic freedom is threatened” (Sharma 2015). The 
relatively high autonomy of Sino-foreign cooperation universities clearly 
demonstrates the situation of “deconcentration” while further illustrating the “cushion 
power” of institutions. For instance, even though the Notice on Further Strengthening 
the Ideological Work (General Office of the Communist Party of China Central 
Committee and State Council 2015) has re-emphasized the importance of ideology 
training, the local practice shows a different picture. A student from University A 
stated, 
“Our lectures could include any areas with any topics. There are no restrictions at 
all. Actually, when we take classes concerning Chinese history, the professor 
showed us videos of the Tiananmen Square Protests… I submitted a paper to 
fulfil the requirement of this course, which explored the relationship of Siku 
Quanshu in Qing Dynasty and the control of people’s rights to express exerted by 
the Party in the current society, and I got an A”. (B2, personal communication, 
2016) 
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Another respondent from the same university gave another instance to illustrate 
the presence of minimal interference from the government. 
“We used to invite an American senator to give a speech in our campus, who is 
always suspicious about whether University A could ensure their academic 
autonomy. During his speech, he mentioned a lot of extreme examples about the 
strict control of Chinese government and its interference of human rights, such as 
Chen Guanghui event and birth control policy … there was no authority to 
monitor or compel us to say something good, but both the Chinese and foreign 
staff and students raised questions, since we perceived his arguments as biased … 
His coming and his speech demonstrated the ‘genuine’ autonomy enjoyed in our 
campus”.  (A4, personal communication, 2016) 
Respondents from Universities B and C also confirmed their statements (B4 and 
C6) and pointed out that all of the selected cooperation universities could offer a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) for students to access global websites. A student from 
University A shared, 
“When I received the offer, the account and password of the VPN were listed … I 
have begun to feel that I was different from my counterparts in other Chinese 
universities since then. I could gain access to any internet resources. There is no 
restriction”.  (A2, personal communication, 2016) 
However, despite some students claiming they could not feel the existence of the 
governments in their campuses, others feel that some constraints still existed. A 
respondent from University C stated that students had difficulty using the VPN when 
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an international conference was held in the city (where her university was located). 
She said, “It was only possible for us to use VPN with the computers but not other 
mobile devices” (C4, personal communication, 2016). Another student from 
University B, who used to major in International relations but has now transferred to 
Architecture, offered another instance to describe the university’s limited autonomy. 
“It may be because my former major is, to some extent, sensitive. We were forced 
to change the textbooks once … It was said that the government had conducted a 
random check, and there were some ‘forbidden’ materials in the original 
textbooks. We changed to other editions of the books to continue our study”. 
(B3, personal communication, 2016) 
Another student from University A shared the same experience. Textbooks were 
sent by the foreign partner university to China and some of the pages were torn off by 
the Customs officers (A3, personal communication, 2016). 
Interviews with the academic and administrative staff generated the same results. 
Some universities could be exempted from the military training and compulsory 
courses, such as the “Introduction to the Principle of Marxism,” the “Mao Zedong 
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Important Thoughts of Three 
Representatives,” the “Ideological and Moral Culture and Legal Basis,” and “The 
Outline of Modern Chinese History” are taught in various forms with little political 
ideology inoculation (I1, II2, III2, and V, with student respondents’ confirmation). 
However, the might of the central government cannot be neglected. The application 
for establishing a new discipline of one Sino-foreign cooperation university in China, 
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which was granted relatively high autonomy, as demonstrated by its special treatment 
as having less than the required 500 mu campus area (in contradiction with national 
regulations; MOE 2006), was rejected by the MOE (Goodman 2016). Hence, national 
coordination does not exist. 
 
Discussion: Neoliberalism and Marketism Coordination---Context Matters 
The observations or findings presented have illustrated how state regulations and 
market tenets come together in shaping TNHE’s development and Sino-foreign 
cooperation universities’ governance in China. The adoption of market principles, as 
represented by “privatization and socialization” and “cellularization,” released 
education from strict national control, thereby creating a conducive environment for 
TNHE to thrive and devolving more autonomy to Sino-foreign cooperation 
universities. Neoliberalism in China may appear to be different from other Western 
countries because the country developed from a rigid governance model; however, the 
country’s authoritarian nature determines its ever-existing recentralizing inclination. 
Context is another contribution of this paper because the real practice of national 
policy may sometimes be in contradiction with the central government’s will. We 
further discuss this aspect from two perspectives. First, by placing TNHE’s 
development within the broad system formation of China’s HE, regulations for 
TNHEs have been changing as China’s HE developed. As Mok and Chan (2012) 
argued, “before China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the government 
adopted TNHE as a policy tool to create additional HE learning opportunities for local 
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high school graduates” (p. 115). The national government’s efforts have paid off well 
considering that the gross enrollment rate of HE has increased from 1.7% in 1980 to 
17% in 2003 (UNESCO 2016). While we recognize the side effects brought about by 
the fast expansion of HE, such as insufficiently experienced teaching staff,  
aggravating education disparity, and declining quality in Chinese HEIs (Wu and 
Zheng 2008; Zheng 2006), the central government has changed its attitude toward 
TNHE, from increasing the quantity to improving the quality, and publicly 
emphasizing the cooperation between Chinese universities and prestigious overseas 
HEIs to offer advanced academic programs (State Council 2003; MOE 2004). 
This changing emphasis from quantity to quality has also been demonstrated 
through the national policies regulating TNHE. From 2004 to 200714, the MOE 
released a series of documents to re-examine and standardize TNHE with the caveat 
against repeating the introduction of low-quality educational resources, and similar 
cooperation programs concentrating on certain disciplines (predominantly on business, 
economics, or accounting) that emerged in the late 1990s. All these policies 
re-emphasized the import of world-class educational resources and encouraged HEIs 
to strengthen their areas of inadequacy in research by fostering cooperation with 
foreign universities (MOE 2006). 
The influence of these documents on the development of TNHE is clear. After the 
                                               
1 A number of policy documents were published: the Notice on Reviewing Transnational Cooperation 
Programs and Institutions, the Notice on Adoption of TNHE (Programs/Institutions) Application Form, 
the Notice on Adoption of TNHE (Programs/Institutions) Certificates, the Notice on the Record of 
TNHE (Programs/Institutions) Certificate Number, and the Notice on the Approval of TNHE 
(Programs/Institutions) of/above Undergraduate Level in 2004; the Advice on TNHE in 2006; and the 
Notice on Further Standardizing TNHE in 2007. 
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release of the 2004 Notice, the number of newly approved transnational cooperation 
activities decreased drastically in the following five to six years until 2011, when it 
started to increase again. Only four programs or institutions gained approval in 2005. 
The 2006 Advice and 2007 Document also slowed down the development of TNHE. 
The MOE released 21 approvals in 2006 and 3 new approvals in 2007. Moreover, the 
effect of restrictive regulations continued to cause a slow down the development of 
TNHE in the following years, demonstrated by the number of ratified activities: 3 in 
2008, 1 in 2009, and 29 in 2010 (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of newly approved transnational cooperation activities by the 
MOE (1991–2016)5 Source: MOE (2016), calculated by the authors. 
                                               
5 Note: 1. Available information only includes the Sino-foreign cooperation programs/second colleges/universities, 
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The development of China’s HE system determined the central government’s 
selective adoption of market mechanisms (Naidoo 2008). We also recognize the 
“infringing” of some national policies in our sampled Sino-foreign cooperation 
universities. The emphasis on local understanding (Hayek 1944) and the importance 
of recontexualizing knowledge (Bernstein, 1990) direct our attention to another 
essential feature in China, the experimental regulation in China’s economic 
policymaking (Corne 2002), which facilitated the phenomenon of “fragmented 
regulation” (Howell, 2006, p. 282). Our discussion has revealed that the changing 
policies toward TNHE are “a form of quasi-law,” in which the revised and finalized 
                                                                                                                                      
which have been reviewed by the MOE according to the Plan for TNHE Evaluation from 2009 to 2015 (the 2016 
evaluation is in process). The available information may not offer the exact data on the number of approvals from 
1990 to 2016 because the information on dissolved ones is inaccessible. However, the figures could demonstrate 
the overall trend. 
2. The number of the new TNHE approvals in 2016 is calculated based on the information revealed on the website 
until March 19, 2016. 
3. Five Sino-foreign cooperation programs (two in Beijing, one in Shanghai, one in Zhejiang, and one in 
Heilongjiang) and their Chinese partners do not have their certificate numbers on the official MOE website. They 
are not included in the figures because our inquiry emails did not receive any replies.  
4. The ratification of the establishment of the new TNHE is separated into two phases: the preparation and the 
official establishment phases (Article 13, State Council 2003). The slight increase of new approvals in 2006 may 
be caused by the ratification of the programs/institutions that have gained the approvals for preparation and met the 
MOE requirements in 2006. However, a concrete conclusion cannot be derived at this current stage because the 
number of annual applications is confidential. Nevertheless, the influence of the policies released during the years 
2004–2007 on TNHE development is obvious if we compared the total number of newly approved programs or 
institutions during this period with that of the other years. 
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formal legislation would be issued after sufficient experience during the trial period 
(Corne 2002, p. 382). The autonomy granted to Sino-foreign cooperation universities 
has surrendered to the re-centralized regulation by the Beijing elites. TNHEs have 
only existed in China for approximately three decades. The central government 
remains at the exploratory stage in developing policies to regulate TNHE. Thus, we 
modified Painter and Mok’s model as follows (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Dual decentralization in TNHE. Source: Modified from Painter and Mok 
(2008), p. 139. 
The present research determined that the decentralizing trend in the Chinese 
hierarchical and centralized political system was subject to recentralization. The 
dashed arrow in the fourth quadrant describes the possible misinterpretation of the 
local HEIs’ activities. They  represent only the experiments conducted under the 
acquiescence of the central authority instead of resisting the national policies. 
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However, we use the solid arrow to explain why the situation of “cellularization” 
should be regarded as “experimentation” in the context of China. This study comes to 
the same conclusion as the results of the empirical data and document analysis that the 
autonomous power granted to TNHE was subject to the central government’s 
changing policy (Mok and Han 2016a). The local authorities (Mok and Han 2016b) 
and HEIs are focused on innovating policy instruments rather than “defining policy 
objectives” (Heilmann 2008, p. 3). An interviewee confirmed, “I know that the central 
government is now collecting more information about TNHE and will adjust its 
policies in the near future” (III2, personal communication, 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
Literature that argued that modern governments would confront the increased 
multifaceted characteristics of contemporary public policy when governing the HE 
sector (Chou and Ravinet 2015; Jayasuriya and Robertson 2010). Our discussion on 
how the central government and market force interact when launching TNHE in 
China has demonstrated the increased multifaceted characteristics of contemporary 
public sector management. Moreover, governing these TNHE institutions requires 
collaboration across multiple policy sectors because the different aspects of 
knowledge policies are under the jurisdiction of various ministries (Jiang, 2005, 2012). 
Collaboration is important when it involves overseas education providers because the 
Chinese government should consider the foreign policy and diplomacy. As a member 
of the WTO, China is also subject to the international regulations that govern 
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cross-border education. Thus, governing the TNHE in mainland China concerns a 
multitude of stakeholders increasingly involved in the design, implementation, and 
evaluation of policies that span multiple governance levels, as Gornitizka and 
Maassen (2014) suggested. 
The present study focuses on the investigation of how the adoption of market 
force in an authoritarian country affects the development and governance of TNHE 
and highlights the multi-faceted aspects of public policy with attention focused on 
national and local contexts. The present analysis has indicated the growing influence 
of market tenets on TNHE’s development in China. However, we should not 
underestimate the “reach of the state” in governing Sino-foreign universities in the 
mainland. Hence, we must also recognize that China’s hierarchical and centralized 
political system still maintains the central government’s considerable powers in 
constituting the institutional autonomy of HEIs. The state’s capacity to create a 
quasi-market, which entails local knowledge and contextual adjustment, is established 
through the feature of experimentation in the Chinese policy forming process. Similar 
observations have also been reported by other studies that examine the central-local 
relations when governing or managing social service delivery and social program 
implementation across different parts of the country (Mok and Huang, 2017; Qian and 
Mok, 2016; Shi, 2017).   
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Appendix: Interviewee Details 
Administrative or Academic Staff 
Interviewee Affiliation Position 
I1 University A President 
I2 University A President 
I3 University A Faculty Member 
II1 University B President 
II2 University B Founder 
III1 University C President 
III2 University C Dean of Faculty 
IV Sino-foreign Cooperation University H Administrative Staff 
V J Provincial Government Deputy Director 
A1–A5 University A Student Representatives 
B1–B7 University B Student Representatives 
C1–C8 University C Student Representatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
